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Abstract—We propose a novel physical layer secret key gen-
eration method for the inter-spacecraft communication links.
By exploiting the Doppler frequency shifts of the reciprocal
spacecraft links as a unique secrecy source, spacecrafts aim to
obtain identical secret keys from their individual observations.
We obtain theoretical expressions for the key disagreement rate
(KDR). Using generalized Gauss-Laguerre quadrature, we derive
closed form expressions for the KDR. Through numerical studies,
the tightness of the provided approximations are shown. Both the
theoretical and numerical results demonstrate the validity and
the practicality of the presented physical layer key generation
procedure considering the security of the communication links
of spacecrafts.
Index Terms—space network, Doppler frequency shift, inter-
spacecraft link security, physical layer key generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the commercial opportunities of space exploration flour-
ish, the space networks become the next frontier in wireless
communication. Thanks to the recent advances in rocket
launch platforms to launch new spacecraft to the space,
availability of dedicated frequency spectrum, the availability
of lower complexity and smaller devices have lowered the cost
of spacecraft supported services including space travels. Today
mostly the small-space satellites are launched into low-orbital
space by top-tier companies like SpaceX, Google, Facebook,
Virgin Galactic [1].
However, exploration of the outer space is expected to
become the near future competition for the countries and the
private companies. For example, with the Artemis program,
NASA targets to land the first human on the Moon by
2024 [2]. By the end of the decade, NASA is planning
to form sustainable space missions that eventually sending
astronauts to Mars. In order to join the space exploration
race, these spacecrafts require innovative technologies that
provide a lower cost of production, launch, and maintenance.
This requirement limits the sensing and the communication
capabilities predicting their limited size, weight, and power.
Considering these characteristics, the spacecrafts that will
be utilized in the future space missions act as space cyber-
physical networks, where the control and connectivity of many
low-cost and software-enabled controllable devices are the
main priority.
The open nature of the wireless communication channel
creates security breaches for the space networks similar to
the wireless cyber-physical systems. Especially considering
the critical research and exploration information harnessed by
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Bob
Fig. 1. An illustration of an ISL. Alice, Bob and Eve represent three different
spacecrafts. Alice and Bob try to establish a secure communication line, while
Eve tries to eavesdrop their communication.
the space mission, the security breach of an inter-spacecraft
link (ISL) would create the loss of highly profitable infor-
mation. Considering the high operational costs and technical
difficulties of restarting a space mission, the security becomes
a non-negotiable concept in space networks. Conventionally,
the security has enabled by cryptographic methods, where
the message is encrypted with a secret key at the transmitter
and decrypted with the same key at the receiver. This secret
key is obtained by solving a series of complex mathematical
problems that require a high computation power, constituting
a challenge for the envisioned low-complexity spacecrafts.
Physical layer key generation exploits the unique charac-
teristics of the physical layer link between two physically
separated nodes to extract an identical secret key. Any other
node would not be capable to generate the same key. Previ-
ously, received signal strengths (RSSs) [3], channel gains [4],
channel phases or spatial correlations of the channel fadings
[5] are utilized as a common secrecy source in physical layer
key generation. Considering the ISLs, continuous randomness
cannot be attained by both RSS and channel fading based
methods since the channel attenuation is resulted from path
loss that is predictable. Based on the following observation,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
13
39
6v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  3
1 A
ug
 20
20
we propose a fresh perspective for the physical layer key
generation in ISLs.
Observation 1: Let us denote the relative velocity of space-
craft m with respect to the spacecraft n by vmn. The cor-
responding Doppler frequency can be calculated by ωmn =
vmnf0/c, where f0 is the carrier frequency of the transmitted
electromagnetic wave and c is the speed of the light [6]. The
Doppler frequency of the reciprocal links can be uniquely
described with ωmn = −ωnm, while the Doppler frequency
of received signal from any other physically disjoint node t
will be different than other ISL’s ωmt 6= ωmn 6= ωnt.
From Observation 1, we can state that the Doppler fre-
quency is a shared secret between reciprocal nodes, while
other nodes cannot obtain this secret. Motivated by this obser-
vation, we will present a novel Doppler frequency based secret
key generation procedure. The proposed method is based on
collecting pilot signals transmitted from two separated nodes
and utilizing the nominal power spectral density samples
(NPSDSs) that will be identical for symmetric Doppler fre-
quencies. As described in [7], one of the key requirements
for a spacecraft is estimating and overcoming the Doppler
frequency shift. We exploit this process to generate a common
secret between two distant spacecrafts without introducing any
additional complexity to the system. The main contributions
of this paper can be listed as
• We propose a security mechanism specifically designed
for the ISLs for the first time in the literature.
• A novel physical layer key generation method that ex-
ploits identical observations based on the Doppler fre-
quency shifts at two distant spacecrafts is proposed. Con-
sidering continuously changing mobility of the space-
crafts, the proposed method ensures that the generated
key cannot be duplicated by any other physically disjoint
node.
• Theoretical key disagreement rate (KDR) expressions are
derived considering the estimation errors at the distant
nodes. Tight approximations to KDR expressions are
obtained by using Marcum-Q functions and generalized
Gauss-Laguerre quadrature (GLQ).
• Numerical results are given to verify the theoretical ex-
pressions. The tightness of the provided approximations
are shown.
In the following, we provide related work in physical layer
key generation. In Section II, we explain the proposed secret
key generation procedure. In Section III, we provide theoret-
ical analysis on the key disagreement rate of the proposed
method. In Section IV, we provide numerical analysis. In
Section V, we conclude the paper and provide the future work
directions.
A. Related Works
In [8], the authors provide fundamental steps of the physical
layer key generation, and compare the existing channel-based
key generation methods. Alternatively, the authors of [9]
introduce a key generation mechanism based on channel phase
under narrowband fading assumption. In [10], the authors
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Fig. 2. An illustration of secret key generation procedure.
utilize a relay node in secret key generation to overcome the
static environment characteristics. In [11], the authors propose
a secret key generation system for underwater communication
channels. In addition to different key generation schemes,
another major contribution is increasing the efficiency of the
proposed key generation mechanisms. The authors of [12]
make use of principle component analysis to decrease the key
disagreement rates at the nodes. In [13], the authors utilize a
wavelet-based pre-processing to eliminate the dissimilarities
of the channel observations.
As described in the Figure 1, we consider any three ISLs
of three distinct spacecrafts. In the considered scenario, Alice
and Bob exploit the symmetric measurements of the Doppler
frequencies as a secrecy source for the first time in the
literature. Since, the relative velocity of the spacecrafts is not
static over time, the generated key can be updated in each
time periods.
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION PROCEDURE
A. Pilot Transmission & Reception
The secret key generation procedure is described in the
Figure 2. As a first step, Alice and Bob respectively transmit
N pilot symbols x = [x(1), x(2), . . . , x(N)] in a time
division duplexing (TDD) fashion. The considered spacecrafts
Alice, Bob and Eve are respectively be denoted by {a, b, e}.
Considering the ISLs, the baseband representation of the
received symbols at the spacecraft k from the spacecraft j,
yjk = [yjk(1), yjk(2), . . . , yjk(N)] can be modeled as
yjk(i) = xjk(i) + κjk(i), (1)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, xjk(i) = ζx(i)ejωjkiT , ζ = 1dPLjk
and j ∈ {a, b}, k ∈ {a, b, e} and j 6= k [14]. ζ denotes
the path loss attenuation, where djk is the distance between
spacecraft j and k, and PL is the path loss exponent. ωjk
denotes the Doppler frequency shift for the link j− k, and T
is the symbol period. κjk(i) ∼ CN (0, σ2k) denotes the additive
white Gaussian noise at the receiver k, where CN (0, σ2)
denotes the i.i.d. complex normal distribution with zero mean
and σ2 variance. Considering the similar quality of the radio
equipments at each spacecraft, we assume that the noise
variance is equal for each receiver as σ2k = σ
2.
The information contained in yjk is fully present in its
discrete Fourier transform:
Yjk(i) = Xjk(i) +Kjk(i), (2)
where Yjk = F{yjk} = [Yjk(1), Yjk(2), . . . , Yjk(N)],
Xjk = F{xjk} = [Xjk(1), Xjk(2), . . . , Xjk(N)] and Kjk =
F{κjk} = [Kjk(1),Kjk(2), . . . ,Kjk(N)]. Since Gaussian
processes are invariant against Fourier transform, the signal
spectrum Xjk, and the noise spectrum Kjk, are also complex
Gaussian, zero-mean, and orthogonal processes. The spectral
samples Yjk(i) are mutually uncorrelated because of the
assumed stationarity of Xjk(i).
Note that, as stated in [15], the phase of Yjk carries no
information about the Doppler frequency, since Yjk has been
modeled as a stochastic process with the aforementioned prop-
erties. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the power spectrum
of the received data as
Sjk = [Sjk(1), Sjk(2), . . . , Sjk(N)]
=
[|Yjk(1)|2, |Yjk(2)|2, . . . , |Yjk(N)|2] . (3)
Since Yjk(i) is a complex Gaussian process, the probability
density function of each sample Sjk(i) under the condition of
a particular Doppler frequency ωjk is given by the exponential
distribution [15]:
ρ(Sjk(i);ωjk) =
1
Θjk(i)
exp
(
− Sjk(i)
Θjk(i)
)
, (4)
where Θjk(i) denotes the NPSDS, and can be obtained by
Θjk(i) = E{Sjk(i)} = E{|Xjk(i) +Kjk(i)|2}
= E{|Xjk(i)|2}+ E{|Kjk(i)|2}
, (5)
where Axjk(i∆f−ωjk) = E{|Xjk(i)|2}, Anjk = E{|Kjk(i)|2}
and E{·} denotes the expectation operator. Note that Axjk(f)
is the a priori known nominal power spectral density of the
signal; ∆f is the frequency sampling interval; and ωjk is the
Doppler frequency shift. Considering Axjk(f) is periodic with
period ∆f , and Anjk is a constant, we can deduce that Θjk(i)
is also periodic with ∆f , and consequently we can drop i and
denote the NPSDS as
Θjk = Θjk(i),∀i.
Proposition 1: The NPSDSs for reciprocal links will be
equal to
Θjk = Θkj , (6)
while any other spacecraft than j and k would observe
different values.
Proof. We can proof the Proposition 1 in two steps:
1) The NPSDS follows the symmetric relation as
Axjk(i∆f − ωjk) = Axjk(i∆f + ωjk) [16]. As stated
in Observation 1, ωjk = −ωkj . Considering the same
pilot sequence is transmitted from both spacecrafts,
Axjk(f) = A
x
kj(f). Consequently, we can state that
Axjk(i∆f + ωjk) = A
x
kj(i∆f + ωjk).
2) As mentioned above, the variance of the thermal noise at
each receiver is assumed to be equal. Therefore, Anjk =
Ankj and
Axjk(i∆f + ωjk) +A
n
jk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θjk
= Axkj(i∆f + ωkj) +A
n
kj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θkj
As indicated in Proposition 1, the ideal NPSDS at Alice
and Bob would be equal. Without explicitly calculating the
Doppler frequency, spacecrafts may individually estimate the
NPSDS from their observation sequences, and they can exploit
this value as a shared secret for key generation mechanism.
In the following, we describe the estimation of the NPSDS
process at the spacecrafts.
B. Nominal PSD Estimation
Let us denote the estimated NPSDS at receiving node k
as Θˆjk. The maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the
parameter Θjk can be given as:
Θˆjk = max
Θjk
{
N∏
i=1
1
Θjk
exp
(
−Sjk(i)
Θjk
)}
= max
Θjk

1
ΘNjk
exp
−
N∑
i=1
Sjk(i)
Θjk

 .
(7)
The log-likelihood function for the estimation problem can
be given as:
L(Sjk(i); Θjk) = −N ln(Θjk)−

N∑
i=1
Sjk(i)
Θjk
 . (8)
In order to find the maximum value of the log-likelihood
function, we evaluate the value of the function when its first
derivative is zero:
∂L(Sjk(i); Θjk)
∂Θjk
= − N
Θjk
+
N∑
i=1
Sjk(i)
Θ2jk
= 0. (9)
The result of this equation provides us the ML estimator for
the Θjk parameter as
Θˆjk = M
jk
s =
N∑
i=1
Sjk(i)
N
, (10)
where M jks is the sample mean of the observed power spectral
density samples. The steps followed in NPSDS estimation
block can be summarized as in Figure 3.
C. Quantization
After obtaining Θˆjk values, terminals quantize and encode
this value in order to obtain a secret key sequence. In this
paper, we assume uniform quantizer with a step size ∆ as
in [4]. From N observations, we get Q number of quantized
secret key bits as qb =
⌊
Θˆab
∆
⌋
and qa =
⌊
Θˆba
∆
⌋
, where b·c
denotes the floor function.
Note that, the main focus of this work is producing the
raw key from a novel secrecy source, mainly the Doppler fre-
quency shift. The key reconciliation and hybrid key generation
algorithms in [17] can be applied to the quantized raw key bits
in order to reduce the erroneous elements in the generated key
bits.
DFT
Alice
DFT
Bob
Fig. 3. An illustration of NPSDS estimation at Alice and Bob.
III. KEY DISAGREEMENT RATE
Key disagreement rate (KDR) is the ratio of mismatched
bits in the generated keys. We adopt a similar approach to [4]
in order to obtain theoretical expressions of the KDR consid-
ering the proposed key generation system model. To obtain the
key disagreement rate, we normalize the estimated NPSDSs
by multiplying with a normalization constant η = N/Θab as
Θ˜ab = ηΘˆab and Θ˜ba = ηΘˆba. Considering Proposition 1,
we can state that Θba = Θab = Θ. Assuming the uniform
quantizer with a step size ∆, an estimated Θ˜ab is mapped
to the lth quantization level, where l =
⌊
Θ˜ab
∆
⌋
and the
quantization interval is described by Il = [l∆, (l+ 1)∆]. The
probability that Θ˜ba locates in Il under given Θ˜ab can be
obtained by
Pl =
(l+1)∆∫
l∆
ρ(Θ˜ba|Θ˜ab)dΘ˜ba, (11)
where ρ(Θ˜ba|Θ˜ab) denotes the probability density function of
Θ˜ba given Θ˜ab. In order to obtain ρ(Θ˜ba|Θ˜ab), let us first
obtain ρ(Θ˜ba|Yab). For a given Yab, the observation signal
at Alice can be modeled as Yba = Yab − Kab + Kba.
In this conditional case, |Yba(i)| ∼ R(|Yab(i)|,Θ), where
R ∼ R(ν, σ2) denotes a random variable following the Rician
distribution for statistically independent A ∼ N (ν cos(α), σ22 )
and B ∼ N (ν sin(α), σ22 ) and R =
√
A2 +B2. The normal-
ized estimated NPSDS at Alice can be modeled as
Θ˜ba =
N∑
i=1
Z2(i) =
∑N
i=1 η|Yba(i)|2
N
, (12)
where Z(i) ∼ R(|Yab(i)|, 1). In this case, we can state that
Θ˜ba ∼ χ′2ka(λa), where χ′2k (λ) denotes non-central chi-square
distribution with k degrees of freedom and λ noncentrality
parameter. The degrees of freedom can be given as ka = 2N .
The noncentrality parameter is obtained by
λa =
N∑
i=1
η|Yab(i)|2
N
= ηΘˆab = Θ˜ab. (13)
As (13) shows the pdf of Θ˜ba is parametrized by N and Θ˜ab.
Therefore Pl becomes
Pl =
(l+1)∆∫
l∆
1
2
e−
(x+Θ˜ab)
2
(
x
Θ˜ab
) (N−1)
2
I2N/2−1
(√
Θ˜abx
)
dx,
(14)
where Iv(y) denotes the modified Bessel function of the first
kind. The closed form expression for the Pl can be expressed
by
Pl = QN
(√
Θ˜ab,
√
l∆
)
−QN
(√
Θ˜ab,
√
(l + 1)∆
)
,
(15)
where QN (α, β) denotes the Marcum-Q fuction. Considering
that Θ˜ab is also a random variable, the key matching proba-
bility can be obtained by
Pc =
∫ ∞
0
Plρ(Θ˜ab)dΘ˜ab. (16)
Considering Θ˜ab is a random variable with Gamma distribu-
tion with N shape parameter and 1 scale parameter, where its
pdf can be described by
ρ(Θ˜ab) =
1
Γ(N)
Θ˜N−1ab e
−Θ˜ab . (17)
In the expression above, Γ(N) denotes the Gamma func-
tion, where Γ(N) = (N − 1)! for all positive integer values
of N . The resulting Pc becomes
Pc =
1
Γ(N)
∫ ∞
0
QN
(√
Θ˜ab,
√
l∆
)
Θ˜N−1ab e
−Θ˜abdΘ˜ab
− 1
Γ(N)
∫ ∞
0
QN
(√
Θ˜ab,
√
(l + 1)∆
)
Θ˜N−1ab e
−Θ˜abdΘ˜ab
.
(18)
In order to obtain a closed form approximation for
Pc, we use generalized Gauss-Laguerre quadrature as∫∞
0
ψae−ψf(ψ)dψ ≈
M∑
m=1
wmf(ψm), where
wm =
Γ(M + a+ 1)ψm
M !(M + 1)2
(
L
(a)
M−1(ψm)
)2 .
The degree of the polynomial is denoted by M , and as
M → ∞, the approximation becomes equality [18]. ψm
denotes the mth root of the polynomial L(a)M−1. After applying
the generalized Gauss-Laguerre approximation, Pc is approx-
imated by P˜c as
P˜c = Υ
M∑
m=1
ξm
[
QN
(√
ψm,
√
l∆
)
− QN
(√
ψm,
√
(l + 1)∆
)]
,
(19)
where Υ = Γ(M+N)Γ(N)M !(M+1)2 and ξm =
ψm(
L
(a)
M−1(ψm)
)2 . Result-
ing KDR can be approximated by
KDR ≈ 1− P˜c. (20)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4. Empirical probability density functions for estimated NPSDSs for three different N values, (a) N = 10, (b) N = 20 and (c) N = 50.
By adapting M , the approximation to the exact KDR would
be tighter. In order to highlight the tightness of the approxi-
mation, in the following section, the obtained KDR expression
in (19)-(20) is compared with the simulations.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We consider three spacecrafts Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice
and Bob employ the proposed key generation scheme in Sec-
tion II in order to obtain a secret key. In a single key duration,
first Alice and Bob respectively transmits N pilot symbols.
Then, they estimate NPSDSs, and feed them into uniform
quantizer. In the meantime, Eve observes the transmitted pilot
symbols from both spacecrafts, and obtain NPSDSs for each
transmission. As the worst case, we assume that Eve has a
priori knowledge of the NPSDS of the pilot message. Each
of the legitimate nodes generate single secret key, while Eve
generates two different versions of the secret key. Numerically
KDR in a single key duration can be described by
KDRjk =
{
1, qj 6= qk
0, qj = qk
. (21)
Considering D number of key durations, KDR for spacecrafts
k and j becomes
KDRjk =
D∑
t=1
KDRjk(t)
D
.
The simulation parameters are given in Table I, where the
values are obtained from [19]. The NPSDS of BPSK simula-
tion is utilized as in [16]. Note that, as the mobility of two
nodes continiues to change over time as in the spacecrafts,
the proposed key generation mechanism can also be applied
at higher frequency bandwidths.
Figure 4 shows the empirical probability distributions (pdfs)
of the estimated NPSDSs at Alice, Bob and Eve. Since
Eve captures both the transmission from Alice to Bob and
from Bob to Alice, she obtains two different versions of the
estimated NPSDSs. From left to right (Fig. 4(a)-4(b)-4(c)),
the number of observations increases. One remark is that as
the number of observation increases, the variance of the pdfs
become smaller. The distribution at Alice and Bob are almost
identical as defined in (4) and (5). On the other hand, the
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Carrier frequency 1 GHz
ωab 200 MHz
ωae 500 MHz
ωbe 400 MHz
Symbol energy 10 dB
Modulation type BPSK
Noise variance 1 dB
Path loss exponent 2
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
N
10-2
10-1
100
M
SE
AB
BA
AE
BE
Fig. 5. MSE vs. channel observations considering the different ISLs.
pdfs at Eve diverges from Alice and Bob, since their relative
velocities and Doppler frequencies are different.
In order to focus on the relationship between the number
of observations and the estimation disparities, we utilize mean
squared error (MSE) as in Figure 5. The MSE for the NPSDS
estimator for the j − k link can be given as
MSEjk =
1
N
N∑
i=0
|Θˆjk −Θjk|2.
As indicated in the figure, the estimations at Alice and Bob
converges as the number of observations increases. Even
though estimation error at Eve also decreases, the error
becomes stable after N = 5. Since the relative velocity of
Alice and Bob differs from the relative velocity of Alice and
Eve, and the relative velocity of Bob and Eve, the Doppler
frequency values observed at Eve is also different than Alice
and Bob. The results in both Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that
the NPSDSs or Doppler frequencies can be utilized as a secret
source between two separately moving nodes.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10-4
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100
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Analytical (N=10)
Analytical (N=20)
Analytical (N=50)
Simulation (N=10)
Simulation (N=20)
Simulation (N=50)
Fig. 6. KDR vs. normalized quantization interval considering different
number of channel taps.
Figure 6 provides KDR values of the generated keys at
Alice and Bob for different normalized quantization intervals,
where γ = ∆N . As the quantization interval increases, KDR de-
creases. Since as the number of observation at Alice and Bob
increases, the error at their estimates decreases. Therefore,
increment in the number of observation samples decreases
KDR more dramatically. Note that, increment in the number
of observation samples would also require transmitting more
pilot symbols and reduces the efficiency of the protocol. Solid
lines show the approximate KDR by Eqs. (19)-(20) while the
stars indicate the simulation results. Note that, M = 100 is
selected in (19). The tightness of the proposed approximations
can be observed from the figures.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a security mechanism for
the inter-spacecraft links (ISLs) first time in the literature.
The proposed mechanism ensures continuous secrecy between
two distant nodes. The secrecy of the proposed method is
based on the symmetric Doppler frequency measurements
of the spacecrafts. Theoretical expressions of the key dis-
agreement rate (KDR) are derived considering the estimation
errors at spacecraft. Tight approximations to KDR expressions
are obtained by using Marcum-Q functions and generalized
Gauss-Laguerre quadrature (GLQ). The provided numerical
results highlight the tightness of the given approximations,
and indicate the applicability of the proposed key generation
mechanism. As a future work, we consider a hybrid key
generation mechanism that harness different secrecy resources
of the physical layer (channel fading, Doppler frequency, RSS)
that compensates the performance of different mechanisms.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Saeed, A. Elzanaty, H. Almorad, H. Dahrouj, T. Y. Al-Naffouri,
and M. Alouini, “CubeSat communications: Recent advances and future
challenges,” IEEE Comm. Surv. Tut., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1839–1862,
2020.
[2] “Artemis,” NASA, Avaliable: https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/.
[Accessed: August 2020].
[3] H. Liu, J. Yang, Y. Wang, Y. Chen, and C. E. Koksal, “Group secret
key generation via received signal strength: Protocols, achievable rates,
and implementation,” IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput., vol. 13, no. 12,
pp. 2820–2835, 2014.
[4] O. A. Topal, G. K. Kurt, and B. Ozbek, “Key error rates in physi-
cal layer key generation: Theoretical analysis and measurement-based
verification,” IEEE Wireless Comm. Lett., vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 766–769,
2017.
[5] O. A. Topal, G. K. Kurt, and B. Ozbek, “Space-frequency grouping
based key extraction for MIMO-OFDM systems,” in International
Symposium on Wireless Comm. Systems (ISWCS), 2017, pp. 320–324.
[6] S. Wang, B. Wu, and B. Wang, “Research on Doppler characteristics
of inter-satellite-links in Beidou-based space information network,” in
International Conf. on Inf. and Automation, 2015, pp. 2910–2914.
[7] M. Mitry, “Routers in space: Kepler communications’ cubesats will
create an internet for other satellites,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 57, no. 2,
pp. 38–43, 2020.
[8] J. Zhang, S. R. Z. Sun, R. Woods, and L. Hanzo, “Physical layer security
for the Internet of Things: Authentication and key generation,” IEEE
Wireless Communications, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 92–98, 2019.
[9] Q. Wang, K. Xu, and K. Ren, “Cooperative secret key generation from
phase estimation in narrowband fading channels,” IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Comm., vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 1666–1674, 2012.
[10] N. Aldaghri and H. Mahdavifar, “Physical layer secret key generation
in static environments,” IEEE Trans. on Inf. For. and Sec., vol. 15, pp.
2692–2705, 2020.
[11] M. Xu, Y. Fan, and L. Liu, “Multi-party secret key generation over
underwater acoustic channels,” IEEE Wireless Comm. Lett., pp. 1–1,
2020, early access.
[12] G. Li, A. Hu, J. Zhang, L. Peng, C. Sun, and D. Cao, “High-agreement
uncorrelated secret key generation based on principal component anal-
ysis preprocessing,” IEEE Trans. on Comm., vol. 66, no. 7, pp. 3022–
3034, 2018.
[13] O. Alp Topal, Z. Liang, G. Ascheid, G. Dartmann, and G. Karabulut
Kurt, “Using of wavelets for secret key generation: A measurement
based study,” in Telecomm. Forum (TELFOR), 2018, pp. 1–4.
[14] I. Ali, G. P. Bonanni, N. Al-Dhahir, and J. E. Hershey, Doppler
Applications In LEO Satellite Communication Systems. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2006, vol. 656.
[15] R. Bamler, “Doppler frequency estimation and the Cramer-Rao bound,”
IEEE Trans. on Geoscience and Remote Sensing, vol. 29, no. 3, pp.
385–390, 1991.
[16] J. G. Proakis and M. Salehi, Digital Communications. McGraw-Hill
New York, 2001, vol. 4.
[17] G. K. Kurt, Y. Khosroshahi, E. Ozdemir, N. Tavakkoli, and O. A. Topal,
“A hybrid key generation and a verification scheme,” IEEE Trans. on
Ind. Inf., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 703–714, 2020.
[18] M. Abramowitz and I. A. Stegun, Handbook of mathematical functions
with formulas, graphs, and mathematical tables. US Government
Printing Office, 1948, vol. 55.
[19] A. Guidotti, A. Vanelli-Coralli, M. Caus, J. Bas, G. Colavolpe, T. Foggi,
S. Cioni, A. Modenini, and D. Tarchi, “Satellite-enabled LTE systems
in LEO constellations,” in International Conf. on Comm. Workshops,
2017, pp. 876–881.
